By Swapan Dasgupta
In his uncharacteristically over-stated proclamation
of separation from the organisation that had nurtured him, veteran leader
Jaswant Singh said that it was now a fight between the ‘asli’ (real) and
‘nakli’ (counterfeit) Bharatiya Janata Party. Although his outburst was couched
in anger at what he quite bizarrely described as the party’s assault on his
“territorial integrity” –a convoluted way of saying that it had fielded another
candidate in his “home” constituency—the commentariat has broadly agreed with
the suggestion that Singh’s exit was a landmark event. Read with the diminution
of the so-called “old guard” it certainly pointed to an ongoing generational
shift. However, far more significant is the question: is the Narendra Modi-led
BJP travelling down a very different political path?
For a start, despite the professed assertion of a
section of the Sangh fraternity that the outlook of the BJP is non-negotiable
and determined by an uncompromising faith in an undefined Hindutva, the reality
is more complex.
The Bharatiya Jana Sangh—the organisational
precursor of the BJP—was established in 1951 as an alliance between former
Hindu Mahasabha-ites such as Shyama Prasad Mookerjee and the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh, a Hindu volunteer body that had hitherto stayed out of
politics. Mookerjee was the face of the new party and did his utmost to bring
together all the pre-Independence critics of the Congress (in the Liberal
Party, Unionist Party and Hindu Mahasabha) into a more relevant new
organisation. Under Mookerjee, the RSS was an element of the broader Jana Sangh
coalition and not the dominant player. However, after Mookerjee’s death in
1953, the RSS had to step in and assume control to prevent the Jana Sangh from
disintegrating. Indeed, since 1953 the RSS has played the role of an organisational
adhesive to both Jana Sangh and BJP.
The Jana Sangh existed for 26 years, making a modest
mark on the life of a Congress-dominated nation. It certainly had a
distinctiveness of approach and even drew a sprinkling of notables who were not
otherwise attached to the RSS but electorally its performance was patchy. It is
worth keeping in mind the fact that Jana Sangh was unable to ever win a state
election on its own throughout its existence. The nearest it came was winning
the Delhi Metropolitan Council election (the Capital was then a Union
Territory) in 1967.
Whether the decision to participate in Jaya Prakash
Narayan’s movement against the Congress signalled the movement’s breakthrough
is a point of contention among scholars. There are those who believe that Jana
Sangh basically ran the JP movement undercover and used the two years of the
Janata Party Government to spread its tentacles. The alternative suggestion is
that the Jana Sangh was always a low-key, junior partner in a movement whose
direct benefits accrued to veteran Congress critics of Indira and the fractious
Loha-ites. Whatever the reality, it is undeniable that in 1980 the BJP was only
a part inheritor of the Jaya Prakash legacy. To prevail in the non-Congress
space, it had to also upstage its other challengers who subsequently regrouped
in V.P. Singh’s Janata Dal and its subsequent offshoots.
The point to note is that right from its conception
in 1951and re-birth in 1980, the politics of the BJP has been marked by a
combination of flexibility and discipline. The flexibility was dictated by the
long-term, single-minded determination to emerge as what L.K. Advani liked to
call the “alternative pole of politics.” The discipline was provided by a
watchful RSS which played the role of both a mentor and, occasionally, a stern
parent. At various point in post-1977 politics, alternative narratives have
emerged in the non-Congress space. Yet, the BJP has never been completely
overwhelmed partly because its organisational moorings are quite firm. The BJP
always has a bunker it can retreat to in times of adversity.
This is not to suggest that the forward surge of the
BJP has been dictated by ideological fixity. On the contrary, few organisations
(with pretensions of being an ideological party) have demonstrated such a large
measure of flexibility and innovation. In 1987-89, despite considerable
internal misgivings, the BJP was broadly supportive of V.P. Singh’s anti-Rajiv
Gandhi crusade. But this solidarity was also coupled by a dogged determination
to steer the larger agenda into an issue of its choosing. When the BJP actually
embraced the Ram temple movement in 1988, it had absolutely no clue of its
potential. However, despite riding the crest of a Ram wave in large parts of
India and emerging as the clear alternative to the Congress in 1991, the BJP
was nimble-footed enough to effect a retreat after 1993. This shift of gear
wasn’t compelling enough to secure Atal Behari Vajpayee a national mandate in
1996 but it set the stage for the National Democratic Alliance that was to
emerge in 1998.
During the Janata Party phase, Advani had spoken of
the politics of aggregation taking precedence over sharply defined ideological
certitudes. In 1998, at the first BJP National Executive meeting after Vajpayee
was installed as Prime Minister, Advani again spoke of a “New BJP” (those were
the days of Tony Blair’s captivating New Labour) that would propel it into a
‘natural party of governance’. He didn’t elaborate too much but in 2004 there
was the unique spectacle of the BJP contesting a general election on the
strength of having achieved and bringing about an “India Shining.”
This attempt to emerge as a classical right-wing
party in the European mould had disastrous electoral consequences. In the
post-mortem exercises, both in 2004 and 2009, the BJP concluded that it could
not afford to alienate its traditional supporters who saw the party as a
bulwark of Hindu nationalism. At the same time, it recognised that the elements
of economic modernity injected by the economic liberalisation process couldn’t
be ignored.
The emergence of Modi as the leader who combined a
robust leadership style with an unwavering commitment to make India an economic
powerhouse helped tie in the two strands. At one time it seemed that the
organisational hegemony of the RSS would be at odds with Modi’s emphasis on
economic growth and individual aspirations of a Young India. But it was the
pragmatism of the RSS leadership which realised that political advance was only
possible through Modi that ended the impasse. The misgivings of an Advani or a
Jaswant Singh were not account of any major ideological ruptures but to the
primacy of Modi in the projection of the BJP. In any other party, the personality
clashes and generational wars would have created major convulsions. It was
resolved relatively painlessly in the BJP because of the RSS insistence on
coherence which naturally meant keeping scepticism on the back burner and
fighting a larger political battle with a united face.
The extent to which Modi represents a sharp rupture
between an ‘asli’ and ‘nakli’ BJP will be judged after the election, especially
if the NDA is victorious. Certainly Modi’s appeal extends to far beyond the traditional
Sangh appeal and many of the new adherents have joined the BJP both out of
commitment and expediency. The process of enlarging the social and ideological
base of the BJP is going to be a complex process and it would be hazardous to
make any predictions. All that can be said is that with their sullenness and
small rebellions, many veterans have lost their capacity to influence future
developments. It is entirely possible that Jaswant Singh and his backers will
emerge from this election cutting a sorry figure.
The Telegraph, March 28, 2014
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