By Swapan Dasgupta
Last Friday marked the 10th
anniversary of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, exactly 26 days after Osama
bin Laden’s jihadis destroyed the twin towers in New York and attacked the
Pentagon. It was an occasion marked by umpteen “Troops out” demonstrations in Western
cities and campuses—a testimony to how easily the steely determination of 2001
has yielded way to the hopeless despondency of 2011.
Yet, there were the
proverbial loose ends in evidence. In a letter to The Times (London), the time honoured way of drawing attention to
an issue, 19 women urged world leaders to ensure that “women’s rights are not
traded away in any political settlement with the Taleban.” “You cannot make
peace”, they wrote, “by leaving half the population out.”
At a time when the dominant
discourse within the British establishment centres on drawing a distinction
between the malevolent extremism of the Al Qaeda and the conservative
traditionalism of the Taleban that basically wants to be left alone to do its
own thing, it is heartening that there are people around to remind governments
of the civilising mission that formed the sub-text of Operation Enduring
Freedom. Just because the war hasn’t gone according to a hastily written
script, does not necessarily imply that it was along a misadventure.
Today, it is only the
military establishment on both sides of the Atlantic that argues against a
policy of instant disengagement from Afghanistan. The so-called “gains” from
last year’s “surge”, they say, must not be frittered away by any hasty withdrawal
and the troops must stay in that country till 2014 at least. Predictably, this
military assessment goes against the tide of popular feeling in the West. The
overall consensus is that this is an unwinnable war and, as such, it is prudent
to leave Afghanistan to God and anarchy.
Recent developments in
Afghanistan have bolstered the arguments of those favouring a unilateral
disengagement. The back channel talks with the Taleban have, quite
understandably, made little progress. A Taleban convinced the West has lost the
will to fight won’t be terribly accommodating; it can afford to prevaricate. More
important, the Taleban has demonstrated through this year that it has the
capacity to strike at will and penetrate the deepest security walls: the
assassinations of Ahmad Wali Karzai and former President Rabbani and the attack
on the ISAF headquarters and US Embassy tell a grim story.
The only positive outcome of
the military slide is that the US has finally been forced into open
acknowledgement of the fact that the preconditions of positive engagement with
the Taleban won’t be possible as long as Pakistan persists with its double game.
What India used to say about Pakistani sponsorship of the Lashkar-e-Tayiba and
Jaish-e-Mohammed is now being said by the US in the context of the Haqqani
network, a group also said to be responsible for the attacks on the Indian
Embassy in Kabul. In the past, when President Karzai used to point an accusing
finger at Pakistan and charge it with harbouring Osama bin Laden and Mullah
Omar, a sanctimonious West used to hurl counter-charges of corruption and
nepotism at him. Now there is a subdued realisation that the concerns of the
Afghan Government should also have been taken on board.
Over the past few years and
more precisely since President Obama entered the White House, the importance of
a Taliban-free Afghanistan has been lost sight of. The Karzai administration
has a long list of shortcomings which are well known. However, it is a marked
improvement from the darkness that enveloped Afghanistan from the Communist
coup in 1978 to the collapse of the Taliban in 2001. These 23 years saw a once
vibrant society regress into medievalism.
Since 2001, Afghanistan has
come a long way, and it is important to not lose sight of the progress. The
sight of nervous, sometimes trigger happy, foreign troops patrolling the
streets and highways offends Afghan pride and often gives the Taleban
resistance a nationalist flavour. But this is offset by the medievalism of a
movement that equates women with chattel and treats ethnic minorities as
targets of purification. A second Taleban government in Kabul may refrain from
hosting those intent on bombing Spanish trains and the London Underground, but
it will not display a similar restraint when it comes to India or, for that
matter, Pakistan. The generals in Rawalpindi imagine that they control the
Taleban and, therefore, by implication, will regain the strategic depth in
Afghanistan. In the process, they may find that Pakistan too is a very
different place.
Hitherto, India has played a
modest role in Afghanistan and concentrated on good works and institution
building programmes. New Delhi was always wary of overdoing things for fear
that the West would see it as an attempt to replay the Indo-Pakistan game in a
third country. Now with the West in retreat and Pakistan having overplayed its
devilish hand, there is an opening for India. Last week’s pact with Afghanistan
opens up a window of enhanced cooperation, particularly, the training of its
army and police. Afghanistan wants a greater Indian role and, perhaps, a
measure of involvement.
The problem isn’t India’s
willingness to do its bit. It is a question of India’s ability to respond
imaginatively, efficiently and, above all, discreetly. Above all, it is a
question of prioritising a friend over a hostile neighbour.
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