By Swapan Dasgupta
Ever since the time a CPI
membership or connection was the best passport for entry into journalism, the
Indian media has been excessively charitable to the Left. A loosely
Left-liberal set of assumptions including anti-Americanism, a distaste for the
private sector and a loathing of ritualised religion were hallmarks of the
English-language media—at least until aggressive TV news channels with sharply
divergent value systems re-established balance.
The most important
consequence of this slanted politics was that the Communist parties (and their
fellow-travellers) were able to punch much above their weight. In its 34 years
of government, the Left Front in West Bengal benefitted considerably from the
goodwill and generosity showered on it by a national media enamoured of its
progressive credentials. Copious tears, for example, were shed when the CPI(M)
Politburo turned down the United Front’s invitation to Jyoti Basu to become
Prime Minister of India in 1998. However, very few column inches were devoted
to examining the realities behind Basu’s reputation as a capable administrator.
For an influential section of the editorial classes that had once fought
battles on behalf of Jawaharlal Nehru and his daughter, the Communist parties
were the holy cows and West Bengal their sacred pasture.
Mamata Banerjee by contrast
was always an object of intense suspicion. Ever since she emerged to occupy the
main anti-Left space in West Bengal she was portrayed as a maverick, an
incorrigible populist and an utterly irresponsible individual. This reckless
image persisted through the 2009 general election when it was lamented that
Prakash Karat had facilitated his own party’s downfall by his decision to
withdraw support to the Manmohan Singh Government over the Indo-US nuclear
agreement. Indeed, a section of the fourth estate clung on to the belief that
her Lok Sabha success was a fluke and that she would be stopped at the gates of
Writers’ Buildings by a determined Left. Even as late as a month before the May
2011 Assembly poll, the media watering holes in Delhi were full of tales of how
there was a ‘late swing’ to the Left resulting from a popular realisation that
Mamata would be too costly a burden for West Bengal. The results told another
story.
The Congress which had
entered into a grudging ‘mahajot’ with the Trinamool Congress after the Left
withdrew support to the UPA Government was both a producer and a willing
consumer of the negative perceptions of West Bengal’s most famous Didi. Sonia
Gandhi and the Prime Minister were no doubt grateful to Mamata for teaching
Karat a lesson he wouldn’t forget in a hurry, but this was coupled with concern
over the consequences of the gentlemanly Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee being replaced
by an unguided missile. In 2011, the Congress wanted the Left Front to lose but
it hoped that the TMC would fall short of an outright majority and enable it to
play a balancing role—a euphemism for insisting Mamata dance to its tune for
the next five years.
These calculations were
upset by last summer’s resounding and categorical endorsement of Mamata by the
West Bengal electorate. Mamata was now her own boss with very clear ideas of
how she would manage relations with her national ally.
At the local level she moved
fast. First, she gave inconsequential portfolios to the Congress ministers she
inducted into her ministry. Second, she sought to undercut the remaining
Congress bases in North Bengal.
The Congress High Command
didn’t respond to these provocations too adversely. Traditionally, the Congress
has always viewed its local units as subordinate to the national party. As long
as Mamata played ball in the Centre, the Congress was willing to turn a blind
eye to her local transgressions.
Unfortunately for the
Congress, Mamata had her own ideas. Angry at being fobbed off with mere
lollipops instead of the grand Bengal package she had banked on, she did what
most non-Congress chief ministers from Jayalalithaa and Narendra Modi to Nitish
Kumar have done: elevate the battle to a principled tussle over federal
relations. It is federalism that has governed Mamata’s prickliness over matters
as diverse as the Teesta Waters Treaty with Bangladesh, the Communal Violence
Bill, the Lokpal Bill and the Food Security Bill. In addition, she used her
representation in the Cabinet to raise awkward questions on fuel price hikes
and the decontrol of retail trade. More to the point, she used her numbers in
Parliament to join hands with the Opposition and embarrass the Government.
The CPI(M) had a position
similar to Mamata’s in the four years it provided ‘outside support’ to the UPA
between 2004 and 2008. It used its strategic clout far more discerningly and in
characteristic Communist style: to support the ‘progressive’ initiatives by
Sonia Gandhi and oppose the ‘neo-liberal’ policy moves of the Prime Minister.
In addition, it used it good offices to secure the appointments of
‘progressives’ in positions of influence and authority, particularly in the
realms of higher education. The CPI(M) more or less replicated the approach of
the CPI between 1969 and 1977 when it upheld the ‘progressive’ regime of Indira
Gandhi, particularly in her fight against the ‘reactionary’ Syndicate.
Mamata, on her part, has not
been so calibrated in her approach as the Comrades. She has been principled
insofar as she has focussed on the big questions and not bothered at all with
trivial issues of appointments to governorships and quangos—something the Congress
is innately more comfortable with. The result is that Mamata does not have
backers among either those who look to 10 Janpath or those with one eye to the
wisdom emanating from Race Course Road. After she embarrassed the government in
the Rajya Sabha over the Lokpal Bill, the exasperation of the Congress with her
scaled new heights—to the point where senior ministers are now singing praises
of the sweet reasonableness of the Left. As of today, Mamata is regarded as the
joker in the UPA pack and the Congress is itching to be rid of her.
For the Congress, the way
out of West Bengal lies in Uttar Pradesh. For the past month, relevant circles
in Lutyens’ Delhi have been abuzz with talk of ‘secret’ negotiations between
the Congress and Samajwadi Party. According to those who make it their business
to fish in troubled waters, the ‘deal’ involves a post-poll coalition between
the Samajwadi Party of Mulayam Singh Yadav and the Congress in UP and the SP
joining the UPA at the Centre in return for Cabinet berths. The Congress, it
would seem, has made up its mind to swap the TMC with the SP. This may explain
why Mamata has sharpened the intensity of her attacks on the Congress.
There is still one
imponderable. The Congress needs both the TMC and either the SP or the Bahujan
Samaj Party to get its candidate into Rashtrapati Bhavan later in the year. It
would be in difficulty if a discarded Mamata decides to back a united
opposition candidate. The possible way out, which is being explored courtesy a
Politburo member of the CPI(M) is for the Left to bail the Congress out in
return for an agreement on the candidature of the present Vice President.
The Left has been playing a
quiet role in accentuating the differences between the Congress and Mamata.
Having been severely battered in the Assembly election, its only hope of a
recovery lies in Mamata self-destructing and a split in the anti-Left votes in
West Bengal.
The Telegraph, January 20, 2012
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