By Swapan Dasgupta
It is not going to be a happy Independence Day for
the many lakhs (estimates range from 2.5 to four lakhs) of people in makeshift
refugee camps in the Kokrajhar and Dubri districts of Assam. The state, Chief
Minister Tarun Gogoi, has ominously proclaimed, is “living on a volcano”, with
the possibility of sectarian violence being aggravated by a bewildering array
of armed groups linked to one or another ethnic group. Overwhelmed by
incomprehension, the otherwise prickly liberal intelligentsia and editorial
classes have turned away their gaze after mouthing the familiar platitudes
about the need to preserve peace. Considering the magnitude of the explosion
and compelling evidence of administrative lethargy, even the by-now mandatory
demand for the Chief Minister’s resignation has not been mouthed with any
measure of conviction.
Driving this squeamishness is the fear of taking
sides. Rather than probe the specificities of the situation in the north bank
of the Brahmaputra, the custodians of the national conscience have retreated
behind a curtain of moral equivalence—the compassionate equivalent of the
plague-on-both-houses approach. There have been lots of assertions about what
the troubles were not: they weren’t ‘communal’, they weren’t triggered by
forces from across the Bangladesh border, and they weren’t state-sponsored. Was
it, therefore, a bout of monsoon madness that affected Assam? If not, what was
it?
It is not that the answers are unknown. But it is a
truth that dare not speak its name. The story of the July 2012 riots has escaped
narration on the national stage because the story-line suggests inconvenient
villains and incorrect heroes.
Leaving aside the competitive haggling over which
community suffered the most and who struck first, what was witnessed in Assam
was a general uprising of an exasperated Bodo community against an unending
wave of marginalisation and loss. Equally, it was provoked by the growing
belligerence of a settler community (known in many quarters as Bangladeshi
Muslims and whose citizenship is contested) that now perceives itself as the
dominant group in at least 11 of the 27 districts of Assam and its insistence
that the special powers of the Bodo Territorial Council to prevent land
alienation be scrapped. On display were two different forms of aggression. The
Bodo violence was born of desperation, while the aggression of the settlers was
driven by anticipation of a new conquest.
It is not unfair to suggest that is the Bodo wall
that has prevented the entire north bank of the Brahmaputra from being overwhelmed
by creeping settler colonisation—a process that began in the early decades of
the previous century and continues relentlessly to this day. For the Bodos, one
of the earliest inhabitants of Assam, the issue is not merely a question of
habitat. It is twinned with larger questions of language and identity. The
community which makes up a nominal five per cent of the state’s population have
been caught in a pincer movement. First, there are the physical encroachments
of land-hungry Bangladeshi Muslims who are already dominant in neighbouring
Dhubri and who have established squatter’s rights over communal lands in
Kokrajhar and Chirang districts. Second, there are the cultural threats to the
Bodo language and identity from the caste Assamese.
It is true that Bodo leaders increased their
community’s isolation by failing to strike strategic alliances with indigenous
non-Bodo communities such as the adivasis and Koch-Rajbonshis. Giving these
communities a stake in the Bodo areas would have given the resistance to
settler colonisation a greater strategic depth. It may even have encouraged the
Assamese to see Bodos as an ally in a common ‘anti-foreigner’ struggle.
Sunday Times of India, August 12, 2012
No comments:
Post a Comment