THE TARGET STRIKES BACK - The rocket attacks on Israel may change the world’s attitude

By Swapan Dasgupta

In assessing events in distant places, it is often helpful to ask a simple question: what would we have done in a similar situation? Had India, for example, been confronted by a constant barrage of unprovoked rocket attacks from across the border aimed at our cities, would we have gone crying to the international community? Maybe we would have alerted our diplomatic missions and even presented a full picture of the happenings to the United Nations Security Council. But our first priority would have been self-defence. In concrete terms that would have meant military retaliation aimed at both damaging and neutralising the adversary. Having demonstrated our determination to not take attacks on civilian targets lying down, we would have been receptive to international concern over a possible escalation of the conflict. But without foreclosing the military option altogether.

The above scenario isn’t entirely hypothetical. Those who recall the short-lived Kargil conflict in the summer of 1999 when India was confronted by an audacious Pakistani offensive will know that this is precisely how the Indian Government of the day reacted. Of course, the mountains where the battles raged were largely uninhabited and there was no real danger of large-scale civilian casualties that would have excited the Western media. At the same time, let us not forget that the Kargil conflict wasn’t seen as just another India-Pakistan brawl because both countries possessed nuclear weapons. There were grave international concerns over the Indian subcontinent being transformed into the “most dangerous” region on earth, and it finally took direct US pressure for Pakistan to realise it was in a no-win situation. Yet, it is important to remember that President Clinton’s pressure on Pakistan to behave would not have happened had India not responded robustly to the aggression.

Arguably, international relations are not always governed by templates and long-standing conflicts such as the ones affecting West Asia are often governed by the principles of exceptionalism. This is particularly true of the unique problems and challenges that confront Israel, a state that has witnessed unending conflict since its formation in 1948. Yet, despite the strong feelings the mere mention of the ‘Jewish homeland’ arouses, it is a measure of some reassurance that the latest conflict occasioned by Hamas’ rocket attacks on Israel from Gaza has, by and large, produced relatively ‘normal’ responses.

President Barack Obama epitomises the trend. Unlike most occupants of the White House, Obama does not have a reputation for being a natural friend of Israel. On the contrary, his relationship with the doughty Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been so awkward that commentators have even speculated over the likely end to the special US-Israel relationship. Yet, his first reaction to the rocket war launched by Hamas was unequivocal and based entirely on common sense: “The first job of any nation state is to protect its citizens. And so I can assure you that if… somebody was sending rockets into my house where my two daughters sleep at night, I’m going to do everything in my power to stop that. And I would expect the Israelis to do the same thing.”

Unlike the past where almost every Israeli move aimed at strengthening its national defences have been viewed as expressions of ‘Zionist imperialism’, the latest tension has not been blamed on Israel. Indeed, the only criticisms of Israel are that its retaliatory attacks have been ‘disproportionate’, have been accompanied by some rhetorical flourishes of its Minister of Strategic Affairs Moshe Yaalon to “blow Gaza back to the Middle Ages” and its threat to undertake a ground campaign if the attacks persist. The rush of dignitaries to Israel haven’t been accompanied by expressions of righteous indignation over Israeli recklessness but a concern that a ground war would be tactically imprudent and result in Hamas painting itself as the underdog. The principle of Israel’s right to self-defence hasn’t been seriously contested particularly when, as in this case, it is faced with an adversary that openly proclaims that “Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it.”

These developments mark a significant departure from 2010 when the Israeli raid on a ship allegedly carrying humanitarian relief to Gaza resulted in an onrush of anti-Israel sentiments in the Muslim world and in the campuses of the US and Europe, and contributed immeasurably to Turkey disengaging from its measured relationship with Tel Aviv. But thanks to its knee-jerk reversal of its earlier policy, Turkey also finds itself reduced to the role of a passive bystander in the region.

It is also noteworthy that the election of a Muslim Brotherhood candidate, with deep ties to Hamas, in Egypt’s first democratic election has not succeeded in making Israel more vulnerable. On paper, Egypt has kept faith with its new ideological proclivities by withdrawing its Ambassador from Tel Aviv and charging Israel of aggressive intent. However, behind the scenes it is fully engaged in trying to cobble together a working cease-fire and not responding emotionally to Hamas’ appeal to join the good fight against Israel. The fragility of the Egyptian economy, its dependence on the US for both development and military assistance, and the delicate balance between the army and the civilian government has made it wary of rushing to the assistance of Hamas.

Overall, there appears to be a creeping realisation in the world’s capitals that, far from emerging as a slightly more rooted alternative to the largely discredited Fatah leadership of the Palestinians, the Hamas has shed very little of its fanatical determination to destroy Israel and drive out the Jewish people from the region. Hamas may have broken from Iran on the issue of support to the anti-Assad rebels in Syria, but along with the theocracy in Iran and the splinter jihadi groups in Gaza, it poses an abiding threat to a peaceful resolution of the problems that cropped up since the war of 1967. Like the LTTE which was destroyed by the Sri Lankan military at a terrible cost, Hamas has absolutely no hesitation in using civilians as human shields. It actively seeks more civilian deaths from Israeli strikes (and ‘friendly fire’) on the ghoulish belief that greater the number of ‘martyrs’ the more the resolve to fight Israel to the bitter end.

For the past decade, thanks to some misplaced humanitarianism, there has been a tendency to question Israel’s credentials on all counts. This has seen many countries wilfully turn a blind eye to the real nature of fanatical anti-Zionism. The latest spat in Gaza may not radically alter this gratuitous hostility to the only country in the region that combines a vibrant democracy with economic development. But even if it forces international opinion (including in India) to look a little more carefully at the larger agenda of groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, not to mention the regime in Iran, it will be a step in the right direction. In the coming years, as many more authoritarian regimes struggle to cope with angry upheavals, the democratic world will be forced to acknowledge that Israel epitomises the values it is comfortable with. The alternatives presented by those who seek an Israel-free West Asia are too hideous to contemplate.

Incorrect as it may sound, the alternative to another organised ethnic cleansing of Israel’s Jews is the progressive Israel-isation—in terms of values and enterprise—of the region. Having demonstrated its hard face, Israel should now look to also marketing its soft power.

The Telegraph, November 23, 2012 

Policy is foreign to Government

By Swapan Dasgupta

At a time when the governance of the country is in total disarray, foreign policy is the least of India’s national preoccupations. Yet, thanks to a blundering government that has lost its balance, India has committed one astonishing blunder and may be on the verge of another diplomatic boo-boo.

The first, predictably, centres on Pakistan, a country which is internally beleaguered and externally short of credibility and friends (barring China). Last week, in an astonishing show of cynicism, the Union Home Secretary accused forces in Pakistan of disseminating fraudulent and inflammatory propaganda aimed at inciting communal troubles in India. The purpose was charmingly blunt: to suggest that the tensions all over India flowing from the troubles in Assam’s Kokrajhar district were the creation of the proverbial ‘foreign hand’.

It is no one’s contention that forces in Pakistan, both official and non-official, are not inimical to India. For a very long time, official thinking across the Radcliffe Line has salivated over the likelihood of an eventual break-up of India. The war of a thousand cuts that General Zia-ul Haq launched in the early-1980s was aimed at encouraging every separatist trend in India, be it in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab or the North-east. Since 1993, Pakistan has also been hyper-active in fermenting Islamist terrorism and its role in the Mumbai attack of 2008 has been extremely well documented. Even to this day, the promoters of the notorious Lashkar-e-Tayiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed are allowed a free run within Pakistan to disseminate their hateful anti-India message.

That certain Pakistani websites run by extremist elements (with or without official backing) did their bit to promote and nurture a sense of Muslim victimhood over events in Assam and Myanmar isn’t in any doubt. Some jihadi elements within India also echoed these themes in their websites.

However, it is one thing to be alert to the dangers of cyber disinformation. It is a completely different matter for the Centre to argue that the mobs in Mumbai, Lucknow and Allahabad were instigated by Pakistan.

The argument that otherwise good Muslims were cynically misled by dark forces may be good for TV chat shows. The problem arises when the Government starts touting this as the official explanation. Naturally Pakistan has demanded proof. And never mind supplying evidence that would leave Islamabad squirming in embarrassment, the Home Ministry has failed to satisfy colleagues in the Ministry of External Affairs. Indeed, India’s diplomats are themselves shamefaced over this ham-handed bid to pin the responsibility for our internal failings on Pakistan. Apart from everything else, this amateurish buck-passing has ended up putting needless question marks over the credibility of the evidence on Pakistan’s culpability in the Mumbai attacks. If there was a well-directed self-goal, this was it.

The Government, it would seem, is so caught up with obfuscation that it can’t tell its rear from its elbow. This week, the Prime Minister is going to take a break from ‘coalgate’ and other domestic headaches and travel to Teheran for a completely useless Non-Aligned Movement summit. I am no kill-joy and would not like to deprive junketeers of the opportunity of buying Persian carpets at bargain prices. Yet, there is a compelling case for the PM to cite domestic preoccupations and despatch External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna to shake hands with President Ahmadinejad and other representatives of the Iranian theocracy.

That India and Iran has deep ‘civilizational ties’ is a cliché that often rivals the ritual boasts of us being a 5,000-year-old civilisation. No doubt both contain grains of truth which are supplemented by material interests. India still needs Iranian oil and needs Iran for an overland access to Afghanistan. The strategic importance of both should not be underestimated. If he doesn’t, it will be shameful. (END)

At the same time, there are some features of the Indo-Iran bilateral relationship that could do with some clarification. The most important of these is the question of Iranian involvement in international terrorism.

It is understandable, though not morally defensible, that India chooses to look the other way (and at times even condone), Iran’s activities in Lebanon, Syria and Israel. As a country that has a glorious track record of preachiness, India has chosen to keep remarkably silent about Ahmadinejad’s repeated threats to wipe out Israel from the face of the earth—the latest one being his Quds Day address on August 17. But why has India chosen to be silent when Iran exports its terror to New Delhi?

The Delhi Police, after an uncharacteristically unpublicised inquiry, has gathered enough evidence to indicate that three Iranian nationals, along with one Indian, were involved in the explosion that left an Israeli diplomat seriously injured in February this year. Despite the evidence linking the Delhi bombing with the Bangkok bombing where Iranian nationals were also involved, Teheran has chosen to brazen it out, in the understanding that India is powerless to do anything.

The issue is not merely that Iran must not be allowed to export its terror, but that India must make it clear that it will not countenance any physical harm to the representative of a friendly country—which is what Israel unquestionably is.

For too long, India has allowed its policy to be guided by spurious sectarian concerns. If the Prime Minister does go to Teheran at this inopportune moment, the least we can expect is for him to tell Ahmadinejad to lay off.  

Sunday Pioneer, August 26, 2012

DEMANDS OF GREATNESS - India is a long way from acquiring the attitude of a great power

By Swapan Dasgupta

The day following a car bomb in the heart of Lutyens’ Delhi seriously injured an Israeli diplomat, the Police Commissioner of Delhi held a media briefing. Apart from the usual homilies about ‘pursuing all leads’ and the force doing its utmost to bring the perpetrators to justice, he issued a brief note about the “sticky bomb” that had made its explosive debut in Delhi. According to a report in the Delhi edition of Times of India, the note stated: “Sticky bombs are a type of explosives crafted from one Bomb and 5 Gel. At point blank range, it can cause a total of 100 damage to mobs and 200 to the player.” The note apparently listed a series of ‘statistics’: Damage 100, Max Stack 50, Shoot Speed 5, Use Time 24, Sell 1.

The bewildered reporter did a spot of research on the net and was aghast to discover that the note had been copy pasted from something called Terraria Wiki, a popular site for players of the on-line game Terraria.

That the police chief of India’s capital and the most high security zone in the country could actually mistake gaming instructions for the technical specifications of the sophisticated explosive that was used in the city calls defies belief. It is bad enough that the police and intelligence agencies were clueless as to which group or which foreign agency could have targeted the Israeli diplomat. What compounded the offence was the impression conveyed that the police in India are no better than a rag-tag force in Ruritania, with its ace investigators resembling Thompson and Thomson of Tintin fame. After this bizarre show of expertise it is doubtful whether Israel or any other country whose diplomats are vulnerable to terrorist attacks will feel any comfort from the Home Minister’s assurance that everything possible is being done to prevent a recurrence and that the authorities are on top of the terror threats.

Ever since a decade of impressive GDP growth statistics has removed India from the list of struggling Third World nations and cast it in the mould of an emerging superpower, there are Indians who have convinced themselves that the transition has already taken place. In their bid to talk India up and aggressively flaunt a resurgent nationalism, successive governments have contrasted the northward growth curve of this country with the southward direction of growth in the US and Europe. This has prompted the conclusion that India is ready to play a greater role in global affairs and even deserving of a permanent, veto-wielding membership of the UN Security Council.

It is not merely the boo-boo of the Delhi police chief that invites ridicule. At every stage of the way to greatness, India has been exposing its utter inability to live up to its self-professed greatness. Instead, it comes across as a nation enmeshed in ad-hocism and gripped by profound uncertainty over its own role. Whereas Great Powers are said to be blessed with nerves of steel, India is a bundle of fickleness and inconsistency.

Last month’s bloodless coup in the idyllic setting of the Maldives was yet another demonstration of the vacuous hype that surrounds Indian pretensions. For a start, India was relatively clueless of the possibility of a coup after the elected President Mohamed Nasheed ordered the arrest of a Judge who had ruled against intitating corruption proceeding against the former president M.A. Gayoom who had ruled Maldives for three decades. If the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) had indeed submitted an essay on the coming together of Gayoom supporters and Islamist parties, it must have been unread in both South Block and the offices of the National Security Adviser.

Secondly, rather than take a principled stand frowning on the removal of a democratically-elected Nasheed at gunpoint, India rushed in with an endorsement of the new government of former Vice President Mohammed Waheed Hassan. It is not that India should have recalled its High Commissioner or done anything precipitate—like the military intervention in 1988 to foil a coup attempt against Gayoom by Tamil mercenaries from Sri Lanka—but a signal of intense displeasure and concern would have done the country’s image absolutely no harm. Instead, India wilfully left the field open for the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and the multilateral Commonwealth to step into the diplomatic void. With growing reports of Islamist activity—symbolised by the destruction of the Buddhist artefacts in the National Museum in Male—India is now ruing its diminished role in the islands it hitherto regarded as falling within its sphere of influence.

The pusillanimity that marked the handling of the Maldives crisis was not an isolated lapse. Last year, India won a two-year seat on the UN Security Council, an event celebrated in South Block as a moment of great significance and a portend of things to come. Yet, has India made a distinct mark inside this select gathering? The answer, regrettably, is a big No.

The biggest challenge that faced the Security Council and, indeed, the UN in recent times was the Arab Spring and the outpouring of democratic sentiment throughout a West Asia which had hitherto been ruled by autocrats. In Egypt, the sentiment in South Block was quite conclusively in favour of Hosni Mubarak. There was a fear, later manifested in Libya and Syria, that known devils such as Colonel Gaddafi and President Bashar al-Assad were preferable to unknown forces that any turmoil was calculated to throw up. There was some merit in this cautiousness since democracy in hitherto repressed states was likely to trigger a regressive strain of religiosity. At the same time, there was a cost to disregarding the democratic impulses altogether.

In global affairs, the world seems to be split in two broad camps. First, there is the West that uses democracy selectively, particularly to get its own back on ‘difficult’ regimes like that of Gaddafi in Libya and the one ruled over by Assad in Syria. Then there is China which uses the principle of national sovereignty to back some of the most loathsome regimes. India has tried to straddle between these two approaches using the legitimate yardstick of national interests. The most difficult balancing act was in Sri Lanka where New Delhi had to balance between a resurgent Sinhala nationalism and a brutal Tamil resistance that sought to exploit ethic solidarities in Tamil Nadu. However, in the case of other difficult situations, national interests have invariably meant economic and commercial interests.  

There is nothing to get defensive about letting money talk—both China and the West do it all the time. What necessitates a measure of introspection is the extent to which strategic interests have taken a backseat. Even in the matter of Somalian pirates, the British navy has been more pro-active.

Is this a result of calculation or merely a function of the innate inefficiency, indeed ineptitude, of the Indian state and the disinclination of its political class to view foreign policy as anything more than Pakistan? Wouldn’t it be more prudent for India to temporarily eschew grandiose schemes such as permanent membership of the Security Council until a time the country is better able to tackle the obligations that come with Great Power status?

There are lessons to be learnt from a China that wilfully kept below the power radar until it was economically in a position to be counted. More important, China used the interregnum for human capacity building. To be counted, India also needs functionaries commensurate with its aspirations. 


The Telegraph, February 17, 2012