Which way will the President swing?

By Swapan Dasgupta

The victory of Pranab Mukherjee in last Sunday’s presidential election has triggered a bout of speculation over how he will handle his new responsibilities. Unlike the distant past when the occupant of Rashtrapati Bhavan was condemned to a largely ceremonial role owing to the presence of a strong Prime Minister with a commanding majority in Parliament, there is intense interest about how the President will conduct himself in the event no single party or pre-election formation secures a majority in the next general election.

The speculation is warranted. Despite the fact that President Mukherjee has been a Congress loyalist for most of his political life—apart from a two-year stint as the unsuccessful leader of a breakaway formation, his selection as the UPA candidate was mired in some confusion and uncertainty. There are grounds to believe that the selection of Mukherjee was forced by the brief rebellion of Mulayam Singh Yadav and Mamata Banerjee. It is entirely possible that had the threat of former President APJ Abdul Kalam also jumping into the fray not been there, either Hamid Ansari or Meira Kumar may have ended up as the Congress’ choice. It is fair to assume that Mukherjee, despite his high standing, suffered from a trust deficit with the UPA Chairperson.

The reason for this wariness is said to be located in the stand Mukherjee took in the immediate aftermath of Indira Gandhi’s assassination in 1984. At that time Mukherjee proffered the view, based entirely on his understanding of precedents, that President Zail Singh should swear-in the senior-most member of the Cabinet as the interim Prime Minister. In both 1964 and 1966, after the deaths of Jawaharlal Nehru, President Radhakrishnan had administered the oath of office to Gulzari Lal Nanda. It was after the funerals that the Congress Parliamentary Party met to elect their leader.

To say that Mukherjee was guided by personal ambition is a conjecture. Judging by his personality, particularly his obsessive fascination with history and precedents, it is equally fair to argue that he was merely trying to be correct. Looking back, it seems outrageous that an ordinary General Secretary of the Congress, a person with no administrative experience, was sworn-in as Prime Minister. Regardless of the fact that Rajiv Gandhi was unanimously endorsed by the CLP subsequently, the question arises: on what basis did Giani Zail Singh take his decision? By that logic, President Mukherjee will be within his rights to appoint Congress General Secretary Digvijay Singh as interim Prime Minister in the event of an unexpected vacancy in Race Course Road. If that sounds preposterous, how can the President’s decision in 1984 be justified? A break from convention cannot, after all, be justified because the beneficiary is a member of a particular family.

What is clear from the extraordinary events of 1984—never adequately scrutinised because of the extraordinary circumstances of Indira Gandhi’s death—is that there are discretionary powers available in the hands of the President to shape the course of politics. Because of special circumstances, it is unlikely that there would have been a challenger to Rajiv Gandhi for the top job. Nevertheless, the President’s decision presented the CLP with a fait accompli. The MPs were left with just no other choice in the matter.

In 1984, Pranab Mukherjee was extremely courageous by putting propriety over reckless innovation. For this miscalculation he paid a very heavy price. Yet, now that he no longer has to answer to the Congress’ first family, are his priorities going to be shaped by this sense of correctness? The fear that President Mukherjee will not allow his personal preferences to allow any Constitutional subterfuge has been uppermost in the minds of those who see politics as the quest for power at all costs.

The problem, however, is that there are just too many conflicting precedents. In 1989, 1991 and 1996, the President invited the leader of the single-party to form the Government. In 1989, Rajiv Gandhi turned down the offer because he did not command a majority. However, in 1996, Atal Behari Vajpayee formed a Government despite not having a majority. The BJP failed to muster the additional numbers in 13 days of office and the Government fell.

As a result of the 1996 experience, President K.R. Narayanan demanded to see letters of support from potential allies when he invited Vajpayee (who was head of both the largest party and the largest pre-poll alliance) in 1998. The President wanted to satisfy himself that the new government was in a position to secure a majority. However, it was this same principle that came in the way of Sonia Gandhi becoming Prime Minister in 1999. There is little doubt that had the Congress formed the government, its natural resourcefulness would have enabled it to cobble together a majority. Indeed, President Narayanan went beyond the call of office and actually tried to persuade Mulayam  to extend support—an act which can be justified by the desire to avoid a second election a year after the previous one. But it didn’t quite work out.

Of course, the ultimate test of majority is in Parliament. But the President has a range of options to choose from to determine who will have the first throw of the dice. The next two years will witness endless star gazing to determine what he deems will be most appropriate. The President’s discretionary powers are adding to the nervousness in the political class.


Deccan Chronicle/ Asian Age, July 27, 2012

An inexplicable act of Nitish

By Swapan Dasgupta

The past week has witnessed unconcealed jubilation in the ranks of the Congress over the apparent disarray in the NDA over the presidential election, so much so that there is talk of an UPA-3 in the air.

Some of the celebration is warranted. What once appeared to be a nail-biting contest between Pranab Mukherjee and APJ Abdul Kalam has turned out to be an entirely one-sided encounter after the former President announced that he was not in the race. The rebellion of Mamata Banerjee has been more than compensated by the support for Pranab from the Samajwadi Party, Shiv Sena, Telugu Desam Party, CPI(M), and, above all, the Janata Dal (United).

To what extent the incremental support owes to the candidate or the UPA Government is a matter of conjecture. However, what is certain is that the Congress’ political managers are drooling at the prospect of a full-scale civil war between the JD(U) and BJP over Narendra Modi, and the likelihood of Nitish Kumar opting out of the NDA altogether. The speculation has intensified following a curious defence of the UPA’s handling of the economy by the JD(U) spokesman Shivanand Tiwari. This has prompted speculation that Nitish’s attack on Modi is merely a cloak for the Bihar Chief Minister either emulating the SP and putting himself at the disposal of the highest bidder or, alternatively, emulating Naveen Patnaik and positioning himself as an independent regional force with no attachments to the national alliances.

The uncertainty is unhealthy. In earlier months, Nitish had made it quite clear to the BJP leadership that he would not hesitate to walk out of the NDA in the event the BJP chose the Gujarat Chief Minister as its face for the 2014 general election. He chose to reinforce the point after the BJP National Executive in Mumbai last month by making a big deal out of complete non-issues — Modi’s lament over caste politics in Bihar (which was actually an attack on Lalu Prasad Yadav) and the appearance of an anti-Nitish article in a magazine in which the Gujarat Government had advertised. In short, Nitish made a pre-emptive attack on the BJP.

However, it is one thing for Nitish to make clear his displeasure of the Modi project. But it does not follow that this should have prompted him to break with the NDA on the presidential election. After all, Purno Sangma wasn’t a candidate chosen unilaterally by the BJP: he was the preferred choice of the leaders of the AIADMK and Biju Janata Dal. Indeed, Naveen Patnaik spoke to Nitish last week canvassing support for Sangma. According to one source, Nitish did not offer very convincing reasons for turning down Patnaik. It is also understood that even Sharad Yadav wasn’t entirely persuaded by Nitish’s insistence on supporting the Congress nominee.

The speculation that the Bihar Chief Minister had secured firm assurances from the Centre on his long-term demand for a special Bihar package does not stand up to scrutiny. Regardless of the merits of Bihar’s claim, the UPA doesn’t have the necessary elbow room, either politically or financially, to accommodate Bihar without making a similar gesture towards West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and Kerala. Manmohan Singh’s comments at the G-20 summit make it quite clear that cuts in Government spending to control a rising fiscal deficit are on the anvil. If Nitish has indeed been given commitments of special consideration by the Centre, these are valueless — and the Bihar Chief Minister knows it too.

Commitments from the Congress at this juncture are akin to receiving post-dated cheques on a tottering bank. No right thinking person would ever agree to such a scheme. And, unlike some leaders of the YSR Congress in Andhra Pradesh, SP and BSP, the Centre cannot use the CBI as a pressure point against Nitish.

Under the circumstances, Nitish’s insistence on supporting Pranab Mukherjee (who, in case, was in no danger of losing) and breaking ranks with the anti-Congress bloc makes absolutely no political sense. In warning against making Modi the PM candidate, Nitish was appealing to other leaders in the BJP with whom he enjoys a good and convivial relationship. But their inclination to listen to him has been seriously undermined by his support to the Congress for the presidential election. Not only has he blemished his otherwise impeccable anti-Congress record, he has undermined the trust he enjoyed with other regional players such as Jayalalithaa, Naveen Patnaik, Mamata and Prakash Singh Badal.

There was a time when Nitish was seriously being viewed by both a section of the BJP and other regional parties as a possible candidate for Prime Minister in a post-2014 fractured Parliament. More than anything else, this owed to his position as a principled, reliable and clean politician. With this one inexplicable act, he has put himself on par with Mulayam Singh Yadav, the perennial Artful Dodger.

Of course, there may well be unintended consequences of Nitish’s decision to break ranks with the rest of the NDA on the presidential election. Read with Mulayam’s U-turn after a mysterious nocturnal meeting, Nitish’s action may have dented the idea of a Federal Front calling the shots after the 2014 poll. The regional players still remain relevant, but the prospects of a direct confrontation between the UPA and the NDA have increased. For an India looking for clarity, this may not be such a bad thing after all.

Sunday Pioneer, June 24, 2012

OF PRIME IMPORT - The Bihar chief minister may have caused a salutary churning

By Swapan Dasgupta

There is something reassuring about the controversy centred on Bihar Chief Minister Nitish Kumar’s views on the qualifications necessary for an ideal Prime Minister of India. Although his interview to a financial daily has set the cat among the pigeons, its impact may prove to be salutary.

Instead of fudging the choices likely to be offered to the electorate in 2014 (or, perhaps, earlier), the main opposition party and the National Democratic Alliance are being encouraged to announce their preferred choice well in advance. Since India doesn’t have a system of primaries, the political churning likely to result from Nitish’s sharp intervention may well prove the most democratic way of parties and alliances arriving at an informed choice well before an election.

In the event of an outright NDA victory in the general election, the country may at least be blessed with a Prime Minister who, apart from enjoying a majority in the Lok Sabha, had also sought and secured the endorsement of the people. If nothing, the pre-election churning may well prevent a repetition of the Janata Party experiment between 1977 and 1979 when complications arose from a failure to blend a resounding mandate with a clear choice of leader.

Of course, it is unlikely that the enrichment of the democratic process was foremost in the mind of the Bihar Chief Minister when he gave his diplomatically-worded but yet very candid interview earlier this week. Nitish has never concealed his wariness of the man who, for all practical purposes, is now regarded by the Bharatiya Janata Party as first among equals: Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi. By suggesting that any future Prime Minister must have impeccable secular credentials and feel for the poorer states of India, as opposed to developing the already developed regions, Nitish was questioning the wisdom of upgrading Modi from a powerful regional leader to the highest rung of national politics. He also made it apparent that would have nothing to do with any formation that went to the polls with Modi at the helm. In effect, he issued an ultimatum to the BJP to either keep Modi confined to Gujarat or face the consequences.

It is almost certain that Nitish timed his intervention to take advantage of the churning within the BJP. Since the defeat of 2009, the BJP has been struggling to maintain a semblance of coherence which has led to its failure to take full advantage of the UPA’s wayward record of governance. What is referred to in shorthand as the BJP’s unending crisis was occasioned by its inability to throw up a leader capable of stepping into the shoes of the Atal Behari Vajpayee-L.K. Advani duo. Within the community of saffron activists, Modi was unquestionably the person with the greatest personal popularity. However, his awkward relationship with the RSS prevented the party from translating his appeal into responsibility. Following prolonged back-channel negotiations, that issue was finally resolved at the Mumbai National Executive in May when Modi was, for all practical purposes, anointed as the successor to Advani. The formal coronation, however, was left pending till the outcome of the Assembly election in Gujarat. If Modi repeats his earlier victories, he will be thrust into the national stage, well in time for the 2012 election.

Yet, despite his cult following among activists, question marks over Modi’s ability to steer the BJP into power at the Centre persist. The sceptics can be divided into three broad categories. First, there is a group of RSS full-timers who are repelled by Modi’s fierce individualism and his disregard for a collegiate style of functioning. They are furious with Modi for totally bypassing the RSS in the conduct of governance. Secondly, there are some veteran leaders and their protégés who are mindful that Modi’s rise will involve their own eclipse. Finally, there are the pragmatists who are doubtful of Modi’s ability to build an effective coalition. Their concerns centre on the recognition that the BJP’s reach is limited by geography and that there has been no worthwhile expansion of the party (except in Karnataka) since 2004. Will a Modi-led BJP, they ask, be left friendless in 2014, just as Vajpayee was in 1996?

Nitish’s threat to walk out of the NDA in the event of Modi being named the BJP’s prime ministerial candidate was primarily aimed at the pragmatists in the BJP. With the party out of the reckoning in large tracts of the country, the possible loss of a valued ally in Bihar would further undermine its chances to be at the undisputed helm of a non-Congress government in 2014. In effect, Nitish has posed an uncomfortable question to the BJP: do you want to be in power or merely fly the flag?

This is a question that BJP pragmatists, including many who have no real objections to Modi as long as he can steer the party to a tally of 180 seats, cannot afford to ignore. The fact that RSS chief Mohan Rao Bhagwat has come out in favour of the BJP’s right to choose its own prime ministerial candidate is likely to ensure that discordant voices in the BJP remain silent for the moment. Although Modi is no longer linked with political Hindutva, the RSS chief has let it be known that the Gujarat Chief Minister is back in favour with Nagpur. This implies that Modi has prevailed in the inner-party battle to secure for himself a pre-eminent national role.

This is not to suggest that Nitish’s intervention will fall completely on deaf ears and that there will be no option left for the Janata Dal (United) but to walk out of the NDA in the coming year. On the contrary, it is more than likely that the coming months will witness a serious attempt by the BJP to address some of the key concerns raised by Nitish.

On the issue of secularism, there are already indications that sadbhavna, particularly the need to rise above sectarian differences in a common quest for development, will be an important plank in Modi’s re-election bid in Gujarat. To what extent this approach pacifies his detractors is unknown. What is however clear is that the BJP does not propose to go into battle in 2014 flying the banner of assertive majoritarianism.

Likewise, the Gujarat polls may see Modi fine-tune his message of aggressive development to accommodate the concerns of those unable to cope with the vagaries of the market economy. Modi is unlikely to ever compromise on the efficiency quotient of government, but he will walk the extra mile to commit himself to a compassionate administration that actually delivers. Modi has consciously detached himself from the poverty glorification rhetoric of the socialists and this has prompted his detractors to see him as an Indian version of an American Tea Party activist. The Gujarat election may see him tweaking this message. He may well be inclined to link poverty alleviation with transparency and efficiency in government. Modi is one of the most effective political communicators after Vajpayee. The imagery he is likely to use in Gujarat will almost certainly also be aimed at a wider, pan-Indian audience.

At the end of the day, successful leadership depends on popular perceptions. Modi’s strength is charisma based on purposeful, no-nonsense leadership. Today, this style appeals to the middle classes exasperated by the government’s economic ineptitude. Repackaged with a dose of personal integrity, it has the potential of capturing the attention of a larger constituency.

Nitish knows that. This is why he has sought to knock Modi out of the race before the bandwagon starts rolling.


The Telegraph, June 22, 2012

M&M forced Sonia to change the script

By Swapan Dasgupta

Mamata Banerjee may well be pilloried by many for defying the rules of ethnic solidarity and trying her utmost to prevent the election of the first Bengali President of India.

However, had she not stepped out of 10 Janpath last Thursday afternoon and announced Sonia Gandhi’s shortlist to the world and then joined Mulayam Singh Yadav to proclaim an alternative slate, it is entirely possible that Pranab Mukherjee would have remained exactly where he was: as the Number Two man in a tottering Government rather than India’s First citizen. Indeed, had it not been for both Mamata and Mulayam, the country may have been weighing the implications of either Meira Kumar or Hamid Ansari in Rashtrapati Bhavan.

To many people, over-exposed to the ways of Lutyens’ Delhi, politics is all about closed door parleys, intrigue and conspiracies. Occasionally, however, as many great events of the past testify, politics follows the laws of unintended consequences.

It is now apparently clear — despite the inexplicable reluctance of the media to pursue the point — that by blurting out the gist of her conversation with the UPA chairperson, Mamata did not show her wanton disregard of the Umerta (the code that guides some people in southern Europe) as Ambika Soni so imperiously suggested on TV. On the contrary, she had sought and secured Sonia’s sanction for blurting out the two names to the media.

Mamata’s claim has not been seriously contested by the Congress. Why, therefore, was Sonia willing to let Mamata make the shortlist public? The answer was self-evident. Mamata’s opposition to Pranab babu — a consequence of rivalries rooted in the politics of West Bengal — was well known. So was the fact that she viewed Vice President Ansari with suspicion, not least because she sees him as too closely associated with the Left. Mamata must have made her deep reservations of the two names known to Sonia. Equally, she must have blurted out her preference for former President APJ Abdul Kalam. Under these circumstances, why did Sonia not insist that the discussions in 10 Janpath remain confidential?

Was Sonia trying to be too clever by half? Was she setting the mercurial Mamata loose to indicate that there was fierce opposition to Mukherjee from within his home State? Would the confusion of Mamata and Mulayam demanding wider consultations have given her the necessary elbow room to smuggle in a third name and, in the process, negate Pranab? After all, many in the Congress president’s charmed circle had let it be known that the Finance Minister was not the lady’s first choice.

Unfortunately for the Congress, not everything can be pre-scripted. It would be fair to say that no one in the Congress ever expected the Mamata-Mulayam list to include Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as the second preference — a gesture that was tantamount to ridicule. Neither did they ever contemplate that Mulayam would give his endorsement to Mamata’s insistence on Kalam. The 16-hour delay in the Congress responding to the Mamata-Mulayam bombshell was not calculated. It was the inevitable consequence of the Congress weighing the consequences of a sideshow that had gone horribly wrong. More to the point, the M&M show had exposed Sonia to the charge that she had botched up her responsibility to manage the presidential election — a charge that loyal Congressmen could never countenance.

What really triggered a panic in Congress circles was a growing fear that, encouraged by Mulayam’s support, Kalam would actually contest and transform the presidential contest into a battle for the UPA Government’s very existence. The Congress was aware that Kalam had kept the question of his candidature open-ended — an impression bolstered by publicity-seeking loudmouths associated with the NDA.

The Congress machinery works best when entrusted with the responsibility of managing politicians. Consequently, it undertook two separate campaigns. First, it put its entire weight behind an operation to detach Mulayam from Mamata. Presumably, this was done with a blend of threats (and the better informed know what they are) and inducements. Mulayam, who, unlike Mamata, is not always insistent on maximalist positions, duly obliged. His prompt endorsement of Pranab after the formal announcement of candidature effectively put an end to Kalam’s candidature.

Secondly, faced with the possibility of a real challenge and the likelihood of an erosion of faith in her own capabilities, Sonia had to fall back on a candidate who was guaranteed to win the maximum support across the board. Meira Kumar was a possibility but this meant alienating a man who had set his heart on Rashtrapati Bhavan. This, in turn, had the potential of triggering a new set of problems which the beleaguered Congress could not afford.

It is interesting to note that whereas the enlarged CWC had delegated the selection of the presidential candidate to Sonia, the aftermath of the M&M drama led to the re-involvement of the Congress Core Committee in the proceedings. Faced with a possibility of a minor muscle flexing by two parties escalating into a larger crisis, the Congress president was compelled to revert to a collegiate style of politics.

The outcome was advantageous for Pranab Mukherjee who will soon be President. It was beneficial to Manmohan Singh who secured his party’s resounding vote of confidence. For Sonia Gandhi, however, the happy ending was dissimilar to the one envisaged in the original script.

And, by way of a footnote, there remained one unanswered question: where was Rahul Gandhi when it all happened?

Sunday Pioneer, June 17, 2012

Regional parties take Centre stage

By Swapan Dasgupta

In explaining his party's endorsement of PA Sangma for the post of President of India, Odisha Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik, has been highlighting the very limited objectives of a regional party in a State where one-third of the population is tribal.

There is, he has insisted, no need to detect a national design behind his announcement earlier this week: it is merely his party's modest bid to stress the need for a Rashtrapati from a marginalised community.

Patnaik's disclaimer of a larger political purpose need not be discounted. However, when his announcement leads to simultaneous support from the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, there are reasons to believe that an apparently small gesture may have larger, albeit unintended, consequences. After all, even if Patnaik is content to see things through a Bhubaneshwar prism, there is nothing to suggest that Ms Jayalalithaa also views her endorsement of Sangma as something born out of purely local considerations.

Regardless of how the race for Rashtrapati Bhavan pans out, the joint Patnaik-Jayalalithaa initiative constitutes a significant departure from the way national politics has hitherto been playing out. For a start, it was two regional parties, each enjoying steamroller majorities in their own States, which were first off the starting block. In the past, the regional parties were happy playing the role of extras in a contest that involved the two national parties and their formal allies. On this occasion, both the Congress and the BJP have been gripped by uncertainty over who to promote as their presidential candidate. Neither has the strength and capacity to be able to exercise their preferred option, and both are reluctant to cut their losses and settle for the next best course.

For a long time, the BJP nurtured hopes of persuading former President APJ Abdul Kalam to run. There are reasons to believe that Kalam wasn't entirely averse, if the arithmetic was right. However, Sushma Swaraj's indiscretion put an end to this plan. After all, there was little chance of the Samajwadi Party endorsing a candidate whose name was first proposed by the BJP.

Ever since the Kalam option was unexpectedly snuffed out, the BJP and, for that matter, the NDA as a whole has been groping for a name that would attract wider support. Unable to hone in on a name, a section of the BJP and NDA has been hoping that the Congress nominates Pranab Mukherjee who, by virtue of his exceptional standing in the political class, can be the consensus candidate. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that the Finance Minister enjoyed more support from the BJP than from within his own party. The whisper that Sonia Gandhi was somehow averse to Mukherjee made Congress loyalists wary of proffering his name openly. Ironically, the alleged scepticism of 10 Janpath only added to Mukherjee's appeal in the Opposition.

Given this backdrop, why did Patnaik and Jayalalithaa jump the gun and choose Sangma, a man whose claim was disregarded by his own party chief Sharad Pawar? I would hazard the guess that the two Chief Ministers detected the prevailing confusion in the non-Congress ranks and chose to force their hand. In the process, they have sent out a much larger message: that the initiative for both leading and organising the anti-Congress forces has passed to the emerging Federal Front.

This has implications for the BJP which has seen itself as the principal opposition to the Congress and the party most likely to gain the most from the decimation of the UPA in the coming elections. Recent events have made it quite clear that the BJP is reaching saturation point and that its ability to extend itself to areas outside its traditional strongholds is limited.

Secondly, the BJP has shown that it suffers from both incoherence and ineffectiveness at the top. Its strong regional leaders are increasingly finding the national leadership to be unresponsive to developments in the localities. Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi has, for all practical purpose, withdrawn his recognition of national president Nitin Gadkari. In Rajasthan, Vasundhara Raje has shown that she will not take Delhi's insolence quietly. And BS Yeddyurappa appears to be firming up his plans to set up a regional party — a move that will set the BJP back in Karnataka by at least 20 years. The net result of these developments is that the BJP's capacity for political initiative and improvisation is becoming increasingly limited —  without some of its leading actors even being aware of it.

Finally, at a time when the national parties are in a state of crisis, occasionally verging on paralysis, the regional parties —  regardless of whether they are nominally attached to a larger coalition or unattached —  are beginning to seize the initiative. If Patnaik and Jayalalithaa or, for that matter, some other regional party, hadn't unilaterally seized the initiative, it would have set the stage for the Congress to produce a dumb rabbit out of the hat at the very last minute and benefit from the confusion on the other side. Now that has become difficult. Has Sangma's entry ensured Pranab babu's nomination?

I may be guilty of over-interpretation, but last week's developments suggest that the leadership of the anti-Congress space is passing into the hands of the regional players. The BJP will be in the supporting cast.

For the Congress, that's not good news.

Sunday Pioneer, May 20, 2012