By Swapan Dasgupta
Economic reforms in India
are usually achieved at gunpoint. It was the horrible balance of payments
crisis and the emotional effects of the mortgaging of the country’s gold
reserves that facilitated the historic process of deregulation by the Manmohan
Singh Government in 1991. Seven years later, it was the wave of global
sanctions after the Pokhran-II blasts that propelled the Atal Bihari Vajpayee
Government into using reforms as a weapon to neutralise the West’s hostility to
India.
The qualified opening up of
the retail sector to foreign investment announced last Thursday is the only
step in the direction of economic liberalisation that the UPA Government has
taken since it assumed power in 2004. It is being said that the retail
initiative will be the precursor of reforms in civil aviation and, perhaps,
insurance.
For the Prime Minister, the
retail initiative may have salvaged his jaded image in the outside world as a
reformer. But while this may have played some role in encouraging him to
overrule Cabinet and Opposition objections, it was not the clincher. What
tilted the scales in favour of a politically high-risk initiative was the rapid
depreciation of the Rupee, soaring inflation and the dismal state of public
finances. In other words, the opening up of the retail sector wasn’t occasioned
by a deep rooted conviction that the present protectionist regime was
inefficient and served neither the farmer nor the consumer. Had the realisation—as Commerce Minister Anand Sharma
put it—that under the present system “the famer bleeds and the consumer is
fleeced” been widespread, the Indian politician would have rushed in with
reforms much, much earlier. The Congress, after all, has very little support
base in the wholesale and retail sectors. The Akali Dal is essentially a party
of Sikh farmers and its endorsement of the reforms is revealing. It suggests
that the agricultural sector wants greater choice in determining who buys farm
produce.
The present system was
allowed to continue for 20 years after the liberalisation process was initiated
because successive governments chose the line of resistance and allowed
themselves to be intimidated by traders. The traders’ veto on reforms would
have continued had the government not been forced to make changes. The consumers
should thank the Eurozone crisis and the UPA’s profligate expenditure policy
that the monthly grocery bills should register a decline in the medium and long
term.
In the short term however,
the Government still has a problem on its hands. There are projections that the
retail sector should see nearly Rs 1,75,000 crore additional investments (some
Rs 70,000 crore in foreign investments) in the next five years. Yet, it is
going to be a slow process. For the moment, the UPA faces a situation whereby the
possible losers are incensed by the changes but the beneficiaries aren’t
terribly excited—because the gains will take a long time to be felt.
In political terms, this is
dangerous. It is estimated that nearly a lakh of people per Lok Sabha
constituency will see themselves as an aggrieved community. The petty retailers
and their families are almost certain to be receptive to the populist rhetoric
against foreign companies and the demonology that is building up around
Walmart. The doomsday scenario may well be terribly exaggerated since urban
clusters with populations below 10 lakhs will retain their protected status for
the foreseeable future. Yet, a grievance is a grievance and with this retail
reform the Congress has replenished the numbers of the burgeoning anti-Congress
vote bank.
They may, however, be
compensatory advantages for the ruling party. Economic reforms have
traditionally won the support of the urban middle classes—a group that swung to
the Congress in sufficient numbers to decimate the BJP in urban seats in 2009.
Despite being a natural supporter of deregulation and the free market, the BJP
has, since its defeat in 2004, adopted a cussed approach to economic reforms.
This has led to a growing middle class indifference to a party it supported
quite enthusiastically in the 1990s. In fact, like the Reagan Democrats, the
2009 election saw the emergence of the Manmohan BJP voters—people who broke
away from traditional support to the BJP and endorsed a pro-reforms Congress.
In actively championing the
cause of the vyapari mandals in the big cities, the BJP has to be careful of
two things. First, it must convince its supporters that it is not a status-quoist
party wedded to serving particular lobbies. Secondly, it must be careful that
the anti-foreign and, by implication, anti-West imagery of the protests it
plans on December 1 and thereafter does not end up creating a cultural mismatch
between the below-35 generation and the ageing leadership of the party.
One of the features of
contemporary India is that the below-35s, who will soon make up nearly half the
voting population, combine fierce patriotic with an approval of westernisation
and western lifestyles. In overdoing the anti-Walmart rhetoric, as Uma Bharti
did last Friday when she threatened arson against the multinational if it set
up shop in India, the BJP risks imposing a new cultural barrier for itself.
Sunday Pioneer, November 27, 2011
1 comment:
"Despite being a natural supporter of deregulation and the free market, the BJP..."
Very poor observation, Swapan-daa! It's not the free market that the BJP supports "naturally"; it's not even deregulation. In principle, it is (and has always been) Hindu cultural (and political) nationalism. ... Just ask them!
This is some form of creative writing that is not expected from someone like you...
Best,
--Ajit
[E&OE]
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